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1 Introduction
How much additional tax revenue can the government generate by increasing labor income
taxes? That is, how far are we from the peak of the Laffer curve? Alternatively, and of
special relevance given the recent explosion in public debt-to-GDP ratios, how much more
public debt can the government sustain?
In this paper we provide quantitative answers to these questions, and argue that they
are highly dependent on the progressivity of the tax code and on the sources of household
heterogeneity. Since the shape of the labor income tax schedule varies greatly across coun-
tries1, a fact which we document empirically in Section 2, Laffer curves are likely to be
highly country-specific. In the last part of the paper we verify this claim, first by inserting
tax systems from different countries into the U.S. and increasing the tax level while holding
progressivity constant, and finally by presenting a case study, comparing the Laffer curves
for our model calibrated to the U.S. and Germany.
In order to arrive at our conclusions, we develop an overlapping generations model with
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, endogenous human capital accumulation as well as labor sup-
ply decisions along the intensive and extensive margins. In the model households make a
consumption-savings choice and decide on whether or not to participate in the labor market
(the extensive margin), how many hours to work conditional on participation (the intensive
margin), and thus how much labor market experience to accumulate (which in turn partially
determines future earnings capacities).
We calibrate the model to U.S. macroeconomic, microeconomic wage, and tax data,
but use country-specific labor income tax data, wage data and debt-to-output ratios when
applying the model to Germany. For a given country we construct the Laffer curve by varying
the level of labor income taxes, but holding their progressivity constant. Because of the cross-
national differences in tax progressivity (and factors shaping household heterogeneity) the
1We take the cross-country differences in tax progressivity, which might have emerged due to country-
specific tastes for redistribution and social insurance, as exogenous in this project.
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resulting Laffer curves vary across countries.
We find, first, that if the U.S. raises the average tax rate to 58% (the revenue maximizing-
level), while keeping tax progressivity constant at its current level, then it would increase tax
revenue by approximately 57%. Second, this peak of the Laffer curve (in terms of maximal
tax revenues) rises by another 6% if the current progressive tax code is replaced with a
flat labor income tax. In contrast, reverting to a tax system with progressivity similar to
that in Denmark2 would lower this peak by 8%3. Third, when investigating three different
scenarios with respect to the use of the extra collected tax revenues4, we find that the impact
of progressivity is substantially robust to the use of tax revenues. The use of revenues does,
however, quite strongly affect the level of the Laffer curve. Forth, we show that, relative to
a representative agent economy tax revenues are less sensitive to the progressivity of the tax
code in our economy with household heterogeneity. This finding is primarily due to the fact
that labor supply of two earner households is less elastic (along the intensive margin) and
the endogenous accumulation of labor market experience makes labor supply of females less
elastic (around the extensive margin) to changes in tax progressivity. Finally, we uncover that
the U.S. can maximally sustain a debt level which is 337% of today’s GDP through raising
the labor income tax level but keeping tax progressivity constant, and that this amount is
decreasing in the degree of progressivty of the tax schedule. Thus, according to our results,
the U.S. is currently still very far away from its maximally sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio.
The idea that total tax revenues are a single-peaked function of the level of tax rates
dates back to at least Arthur Laffer. This peak and the associated tax rate at which it is
attained are of great interest for two related reasons. First, it signifies the maximal tax
revenue that a government can raise. Second, allocations arising from tax rates to the right
of the peak lead to Pareto-inferior allocations with standard household preferences, relative
to the tax rates to the left of the peak that generate the same tax revenue for the government.
2We find Denmark to have the most progressive taxes in the OECD.
3In Section 7 we find that the impact of progressivity is even larger in Germany.
4(1) extra revenues are redistributed lump-sum to households, (2) extra revenues are used to pay interest
on an adjusted level of government debt, (3) extra revenues are wasted by the government.
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Thus the peak of the Laffer curve constitutes the positive and normative limit to income
tax revenue generation by a benevolent government operating in a market economy, and its
value is therefore of significant policy interest.
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) in a recent paper characterize Laffer curves for the US and
the EU 14 in the context of a model with infinitely lived representative agents, flat taxes
and a labor supply choice only along the intensive margin. They find that the peak of
the labor income tax Laffer curve in both regions is located at a tax rate between 50%
and 70%, depending on parameter values. The authors also show that the Laffer curve
remains unchanged, with the appropriate assumptions, if the representative agent paradigm
is replaced with a population that is ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their ability to
earn income, and progressive taxation is permitted. We argue here that in a quantitative
life cycle model with realistically calibrated wage heterogeneity and risk, extensive margin
labor supply choice as well as endogenous human capital accumulation, the degree of tax
progressivity not only significantly changes the level and location of the peak of the Laffer
curve for a given country, but also strongly affects the differences across countries, relative
to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)’s analysis.
Why and how does the degree of tax progressivity matter for the ability of the gov-
ernment to generate labor income tax revenues in an economy characterized by household
heterogeneity and wage risk? In general, the shape of the Laffer curve is closely connected
to the individual (and then appropriately aggregated) response of labor supply to taxes. In
his extensive survey of the literature on labor supply and taxation Keane (2011) argues that
labor supply choices both along the intensive and extensive margin, life-cycle considerations
and human capital accumulation are crucial model elements when studying the impact of
taxes on labor supply. In the presence of these model elements the progressivity of the labor
income tax schedule is likely to matter for the response of tax revenues to the level of taxes,
although the magnitude and even the direction are not a priori clear.
There are several, potentially opposing, effects of the degree of tax progressivity on the
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response of tax revenues to the level of taxes. Keeping hours worked constant, with higher
tax progressivity more taxes are collected from the high-earners and less taxes from the low-
earners. However, changes in tax progressivity also affect hours worked. In a representative
agent model, making the tax schedule progressive reduces hours worked, due to an increase in
the wedge the labor income tax creates in the household’s intratemporal optimality condition
(see Section 2). In contrast, in a model with rich household heterogeneity, tax progressivity
will have a differential impact on hours worked by high- and low-earners. First, increasing tax
progressivity induces differential income and substitution effects on the workers in different
parts on the earnings distribution (which we will illustrate again in section 2). In addition,
the presence of an extensive margin typically leads to a higher labor supply elasticity for
low wage agents who decide whether or not to participate in the labor market. A more
progressive tax system with relatively low tax rates around the participation margin where
the labor supply elasticity is high may in fact help to increase revenue if more agents decide
to participate in the labor market.5
In addition, in life-cycle models the presence of labor market risk leads to higher labor
supply elasticity for older agents due to a strong precautionary motive for younger agents,
see e.g. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). As older agents have higher wages due to more
accumulated labor market experience, a more progressive tax system may disproportionately
reduce labor supply for old and thus high wage earners, and therefore lead to a reduction
in tax revenue. Furthermore, when agents undergo a meaningful life-cycle, more progressive
taxes reduce the incentives for young agents to accumulate labor market experience and
become high (and thus more highly taxed) earners in the first place. This effect lowers
tax revenues from agents at all ages as younger households will work less and older agents
will have lower wages (in addition to working less). When human capital accumulation is
modeled as learning by doing (as proxied by years of labor market experience) as in Section
3, the life-cycle human capital effect is, however, counteracted by a greater short term benefit
5Which is in fact what we find in our model for single women. See Section 6.1 for details.
4
(higher net wages in the short run) from accumulating human capital. Thus the question of
how the degree of tax progressivity impacts the tax level - tax revenue relationship (i.e. the
Laffer curve) is a quantitative one, and the one we take up in this work.
The paper by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) has sparked new interest in the shape and
international comparison of Laffer curves. Another paper that computationally derives this
curve in a heterogeneous household economy close to that studied by Aiyagari (1994) is Feve,
Matheron, and Sahuc (2013). In addition to important modeling differences, their focus is
on how the Laffer curve depends on outstanding government debt, whereas we are mainly
concerned with the impact of the progressivity of the labor income tax code on the Laffer
curve. Two closely related papers by Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura (2014) and Badel
and Huggett (2014b) focus on how much more revenue can be raised by starting from the
current US tax system and making it more progressive. In line with our findings, they find
a limited potential for increasing revenues through increasing the progressivity of the tax
system. Chen and Imrohoroglu (2013) study the relationship between tax levels and the US
debt, whereas Kindermann and Krueger (2014) characterize the optimal top marginal tax rate
in a model fairly similar to ours, but are not concerned with deriving Laffer curves for overall
labor income tax revenue.6 Finally, Badel and Huggett (2014a) analytically characterize the
revenue-maximizing top marginal tax rate in a broad class of dynamic economies, relating
it to several sufficient statistics that include three easy-to-interpret elasticities. They are
also not concerned with deriving Laffer curves for the overall labor income tax code, but
rather focus on the impact of the maximal marginal tax rate, taking other features of the
tax system as given.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our measure of tax progres-
sivity and develop a progressivity index by which we rank OECD countries. In Section 3 we
describe our quantitative OLG economy with heterogeneous households and define a com-
6Our overall modeling strategy broadly follows the literature on quantitative general equilibrium life-
cycle models. See Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) and Kubler and Schmedders (2012) for representative
examples.
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petitive equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the calibration and country-specific estimation
of the model parameters, and Section 5 describes the computational Laffer curve thought
experiments we implement in this paper. The main quantitative results of the paper with
respect to the impact of tax progressivity and household heterogeneity are presented in Sec-
tion 6. Section 7 demonstrates how the labor income tax structure from different countries
would affect the peak of the U.S. Laffer curve and extends the analysis to Germany. We
conclude in Section 8. The appendix discusses the transformation of a growing economy
with extensive labor supply margin into a stationary economy, as well as the details of the
estimation of the stochastic wage processes from micro data.
2 Tax Progressivity in OECD Countries
Labor income taxes in the OECD are generally progressive and differ by household composi-
tion. To approximate country tax functions, we use the labor income tax function proposed
by Benabou (2002) and also recently employed by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2012) who argue that it fits the U.S. data well.7 Let y denote pre-tax (labor) income and
ya after tax income. The tax function is implicitly defined by the mapping between pre-tax
and after-tax labor income:
ya = θ0y
1−θ1 (1)
We use labor income tax data from the OECD to estimate the parameters θ0 and θ1 for
different family types, under the assumption that married couples are taxed on their joint
earnings. We normalize earnings by the average earnings of single individuals in each country,
AE, and estimate τ(y/AE). Table 5 in the Appendix summarizes our findings.
There are many ways to measure tax progressivity. We summarize the progressivity of
the tax code by the following concept of the progressivity tax wedge between income y1 and
income y2 > y1:
7see Appendix 9.3 for more details.
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PW (y1, y2) = 1− 1− T
′(y2)
1− T ′(y1) (2)
where T ′ is the marginal tax rate a household with income y pays. Wedge based measures
of progressivity are common in the literature, for example, similar progressivity measures
have been used by Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2003) and Guvenen, Kuruscu, and
Ozkan (2009). As long as the tax code is weakly progressive and thus T ′(y2) ≥ T ′(y1) this
measure takes a value between 0 and 1. It is equal to zero for a proportional tax code for
all income levels y1 and y2 and increases with the increase in the marginal tax rate T
′ as
earnings increases from y1 to y2.
With our tax function tax progressivity is uniquely determined by the parameter θ1 and
independent of the scale parameter θ0, see Section 9.3. By varying θ0 we can then increase
the tax level while at the same time keeping tax progressivity (as measured by the wedge)
constant for all levels of y1 and y2.
Table 1: Tax Progressivity in the OECD 2000-2007
Country Progressivity Index Relative Progressivity (US=1)
Japan 0.101 0.74
Switzerland 0.133 0.97
Portugal 0.136 0.99
US 0.137 1.00
France 0.142 1.03
Spain 0.148 1.08
Norway 0.169 1.23
Luxembourg 0.180 1.31
Italy 0.180 1.31
Austria 0.187 1.37
Canada 0.193 1.41
UK 0.200 1.46
Greece 0.201 1.47
Iceland 0.204 1.49
Germany 0.221 1.61
Sweden 0.223 1.63
Ireland 0.226 1.65
Finland 0.237 1.73
Netherlands 0.254 1.85
Denmark 0.258 1.88
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To obtain an index of tax progressivity across countries, we fit the tax function in equation
(1) for singles without children8 and married couples with zero, one and two children (the
household types which we will have in the model in Section 3). We then take the sum of the
estimated θ1’s weighted by each family type’s share of the population in the U.S. Table 1
displays the progressivity index for the U.S., Canada, Japan, and all the countries in Western
Europe.
We observe that there is considerable cross-country variation in tax progressivity in the
OECD. As measured by the tax progressivity wedge Japan has the least progressive taxes,
whereas the most progressive tax code can be found in Denmark. As measured by the index,
taxes in Denmark are about 2.5 times more progressive than in Japan9. The U.S. is among
the countries with least progressive tax codes.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
(wh)/AE
Tax wedge
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
(wh)/AE
Tax rate, τ
 
 
Flat tax
US prog.
2 x US prog.
Figure 1: Changing tax progressivity
The right panel of figure 1 shows the average tax rate function that we obtain for U.S.
singles (green line), plotted against labor earnings relative to average earnings, AE, and
8In the model we assume that singles do not have children and that the maximum number of children is 2.
We therefore give θ1 for singles without children the population weight of all singles and θ1 for married couples
the population weight of married couples with 2 or more children. We use U.S. population shares to avoid
conflating cross-county differences in tax progressivity with cross-country differences in family structures.
9In Section 6 below we find that countries raise more revenue and sustain more debt with flatter taxes.
This is consistent with the observation that Japan not only has the flattest taxes in the OECD but also the
highest debt-to-GDP ratio.
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how it changes as we multiply θ1 in that function by 0 (converting it to a flat tax) or by 2
(approaching the progressivity of the Danish tax system).
The entity that determines the distortionary effect of progressive taxes on labor supply is
the tax wedge in the households’ intratemporal first order condition,10 given by τ + wh
AE
τ ′ =
T ′( wh
AE
). The left panel of figure 1 plots this tax wedge against labor earnings. As we discussed
in section 1, changes in tax progressivity introduce opposite income and substitution effects
on high- and low-earners. The right panel shows that increasing tax progressivity raises
average tax rates and thus introduces a positive income effect on the hours worked of the
high-earners, with the opposite effect on the low-earners. The left panel shows that the same
experiment raises the tax wedge, thereby introducing a negative substitution effect on the
high-earners (as well as most of the workers), but has an opposite effect on the workers in
the lowest part of the earnings distribution.
3 The Model
In this section we describe the model we will use to characterize the shape of the Laffer curve
for different countries, and specifically discuss the model elements that sets our heterogeneous
household economy apart from the representative agent model employed by Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011).
3.1 Technology
There is a representative firm which operates using a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt(Kt, Lt) = K
α
t [ZtLt]
1−α
10With a flat labor income tax, the first-order condition which characterizes the choice of hours worked is
given by u′cw(1− τ) = −u′h, whereas with progressive taxation, it becomes u′cw(1− (τ +
wh
AE
τ ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax wedge
) = −u′h.
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where Kt is the capital input, Lt is the labor input measured in terms of efficiency units,
and Zt is the labor-augmenting productivity. The evolution of capital is described by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
where It is the gross investment, and δ is the capital depreciation rate. We assume that Zt,
the labour-augmenting productivity parameter, grows deterministically at rate µ:
Zt = Z0(1 + µ)
t.
The production function and the accumulation of capital equation imply that on the balanced
growth path, capital, investment, output and consumption will all grow at the same rate
µ11. For convenience, we will set Z0 = 1. Each period, the firm hires labor and capital to
maximize its profit:
Πt = Yt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt.
In a competitive equilibrium, the factor prices will be equal to their marginal products:
wt = ∂Yt/∂Lt = (1− α)Z1−αt
(
Kt
Lt
)α
= (1− α)Zt
(
Kt/Zt
Lt
)α
(3)
rt = ∂Yt/∂Kt − δ = αZ1−αt
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
− δ = α
(
Lt
Kt/Zt
)1−α
− δ (4)
We restrict our analysis to balanced growth equilibria (in which long-run growth is gen-
erated by an exogenous technological progress). Following King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002)
and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), we need to impose some restrictions on the production
technology, preferences, as well as government policy functions that allow us to transform
the growing economy into a corresponding stationary one, using straightforward variable
transformation.
11See King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002).
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To start, along a balanced growth path (BGP) Kz = Kt/Zt will be constant. We fur-
thermore define wzt = wt/Zt, and note that both w
z
t and rt will also remain constant on the
BGP, so we drop the time subscript for these variables as well.
3.2 Demographics
The economy is populated by J overlapping generations of finitely lived households. We
model heterogeneity in family structure explicitly since in the data family type is an impor-
tant determinant of the income tax code, something we wish to capture in our model. There
are 5 types of households; single males, single females, and married couples with x ∈ {0, 1, 2}
children12. We assume that within the same married household, the husband and the wife
are of the same age. All households start life at age 20 and enter retirement at age 65.
We follow Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003) and Chakraborty, Holter, and Stepanchuk (2012)
in modeling marriage and divorce as exogenous shocks. Let j denote the household’s age.
Single households face an age-dependent probability, M(j), of becoming married whereas
married households face an age-dependent probability, D(j), of divorce. Single individuals
who enter marriage have rational expectations about the type of a potential partner and
face an age-dependent probability distribution, Ξ(x, j), over the number of children in the
household. Married households face age-dependent transition probabilities, Υ(x, x′, j), be-
tween 0,1, and 2 children in the households. We assume for simplicity that single households
do not have children and that children ”disappear” when a divorce occurs.13
The probability of dying while working is zero; retired households, on the other hand,
face an age-dependent probability of dying, pi(j), and die for certain at model age J = 76,
corresponding to a real world age of 100. By assumption a husband and a wife both die
at the same age. A model period is 1 year, so there are a total of 45 model periods of
12In our model, children only influence the labor income tax code that a household faces. Given that family
structure is exogenous and that we will assume logarithmic utility from consumption, modeling consumption
needs of children explicitly via household equivalence scales would not change the household maximization
problem.
13Again, given our utility function the consumption requirements these children may have would not affect
the household decision problem.
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active work life. We assume that the size of the population is fixed (there is no population
growth). We normalize the size of each new cohort to 1. Using ω(j) = 1−pi(j) to denote the
age-dependent survival probability, by the law of large numbers the mass of retired agents
of age j ≥ 65 still alive at any given period is equal to Ωj =
∏q=j−1
q=65 ω(q).
In addition to age, marital status, and number of children, households are heterogeneous
with respect to asset holdings, exogenously determined ability of its members, their years of
labor market experience, and idiosyncratic productivity shocks (market luck). We assume
that men always work some positive hours during their working age. However, a woman can
either work or stay at home. Married households jointly decide on how many hours to work,
how much to consume, and how much to save. Females who participate in the labor market,
accumulate one year of labor market experience. Since men always work, they accumulate
an additional year of working experience every period. Retired households make no labor
supply decisions but receive a social security payment, Ψt.
There are no annuity markets, so that a fraction of households leave unintended bequests
which are redistributed in a lump-sum manner between the households that are currently
alive. We use Γt to denote the per-household bequest.
3.3 Labor Income
The wage of an individual depends on the aggregate wage per efficiency unit of labor, wz,
and the number of efficiency units the individual is endowed with. The latter depends on the
individual’s gender, ι ∈ (m,w), ability, a ∼ N(0, σ2ι ), accumulated labor market experience,
e, and an idiosyncratic shock, u, which follows an AR(1) process which is common to all
individuals of the same gender (but of course the realization of this shock is not common to
all households). Thus, the wage of an individual with characteristics (a, e, u, ι) is given by:
log(wz(a, e, u, ι)) = log(wz) + a+ γ0ι + γ1ιe+ γ2ιe
2 + γ3ιe
3 + u (5)
u′ = ριu+ ,  ∼ N(0, σ2ι) (6)
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γ0ι here captures the gender wage gap. γ1ι, γ2ι and γ3ι capture returns to experience for
women and the age profile of wages for men.
3.4 Preferences
We assume that married couples jointly solve a maximization problem where they put equal
weight on the utility of each spouse. Their momentary utility function, UM , depends on
work hours of the husband, nm ∈ (0, 1], and the wife, nw ∈ [0, 1], and takes the following
form:
UM(c, nm, nw) = log(c)− 1
2
χMm
(nm)1+η
m
1 + ηm
− 1
2
χMw
(nw)1+η
w
1 + ηw
− 1
2
FMw · 1[nw>0] (7)
where FMw ∼ N(µFMw , σ2FMw) is a fixed disutility from working positive hours. The indicator
function, 1[n>0], is equal to 0 when n = 0 and equal to 1 when n > 0. The momentary utility
function for singles is given by:
US(c, n, ι) = log(c)− χSι (n)
1+ηι
1 + ηι
− F Sι · 1[n>0] (8)
We allow the disutility of work to differ by gender and marital status and the fixed cost of
work for women to differ by marital status.
King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002) show that in a setup with no participation decision, the
above preferences are consistent with balanced growth. In the appendix, we demonstrate
that this continues to hold with fixed disutility from working positive hours and operative
extensive margin.
3.5 Government
The government runs a balanced social security system where it taxes employees and the
employer (the representative firm) at rates τss and τ˜ss and pays benefits, Ψt, to retirees. The
government also taxes consumption, labor and capital income to finance the expenditures
on pure public consumption goods, Gt, which enter separable in the utility function, inter-
13
est payments on the national debt, rBt, lump sum redistributions, gt, and unemployment
benefits Tt. We assume that there is some outstanding government debt, and that the gov-
ernment debt to output ratio, BY = Bt/Yt, is constant over time. Spending on pure public
consumption is also assumed to be proportional to GDP so that, GY = Gt/Yt is constant.
Consumption and capital income are taxed at flat rates τc, and τk. To model the non-linear
labor income tax, we use the functional form proposed in Benabou (2002) and recently used
in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012):
ya = θ0y
1−θ1
where y denotes pre-tax (labor) income, ya after-tax income, and the parameters θ0 and θ1
govern the level and the progressivity of the tax code, respectively.14. Heathcote, Storeslet-
ten, and Violante (2012) argue that this fits the U.S. data well. We fit family type specific
tax schedules. In addition, the government collects social security contributions to finance
the retirement benefits.
On a BGP with constant tax rates, the ratio of government revenues to output will
remain constant. Gt, gt, Ψt and Tt must also remain proportional to output.
We define the following ratios:
Rz = Rt/Zt, R
ssz = Rsst /Z, g
z = gt/Zt, G
z = Gt/Zt, Ψ
z = Ψt/Zt, T
z = Tt/Zt
where Rt are the government’s revenues from the labor, capital and consumption taxes and
Rsst are the government’s revenues from the social security taxes. Denoting the fraction of
women15 that work 0 hours by ζt, we can write the government budget constraints (normal-
14A further discussion of the properties of this tax function is provided in the appendix
15Recall that we assume that men always work.
14
ized by GDP) as:
gz
(
45 +
∑
j≥65
Ωj
)
+
45
2
T zζt +G
z + (r − µ)Bz = Rz
Ψz
(∑
j≥65
Ωj
)
= Rssz.
The second equation assures budget balance in the social security system by equating
per capita benefits times the number of retired individuals to total tax revenues from social
security taxes. The first equation is the regular government budget constraint on a balanced
growth path. The government spends resources on per capita transfers (times the number
of individuals in the economy), on unemployment benefits for women that work zero hours,
on government consumption and on servicing the interest on outstanding government debt,
and has to finance these outlays through tax revenue.
3.6 Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
At any given time, a married household is characterized by (k, em, ew, um, uw, am, aw, x, j),
where k is the household’s savings, em and ew are the husband’s (“man”) and the wife’s
(“woman”) experience level, um and uw are their transitory productivity shocks, while am
and aw are their permanent ability levels. Finally, x is the household’s number of children
and j is the household’s age. Recall that we assumed that the male’s experience is always
equal to his age, em = j, and we can therefore drop em from the state space for married
couples. The state space for a single household is (k, e, u, a, ι, j).
To formulate the household problem along the BGP recursively, we first define:
czj = ct,j/Zt, k
z
j = kt,j/Zt.
where ct,j and kt,j are the household’s consumption and savings.
Since on the BGP the ratio of aggregate consumption and savings to output (and thus
to Zt) remains constant over time, we also conjecture that household-level c
z
j and k
z
j will not
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depend on calendar time, so that we can omit the time subscript for them as well. For the
same reason, Γz = Γt/Zt will not change over time. We can then formulate the optimization
problem of a married household recursively:
V M(kz, ew,um, uw, am, aw, x, j) = max
cz ,(kz)′,nm,nw
[
U (c, nm, nw)
+ β(1−D(j))E(um)′,(uw)′,x′
[
V M((kz)′, (ew)′, (um)′, (uw)′, am, aw, x′, j + 1)
]
+
1
2
βD(j)E(um)′,(uw)′
[
V S((kz)′/2, u′, a,m, j + 1) + V S((kz)′/2, (ew)′, u′, a, w, j + 1)
]]
s.t.:
cz(1 + τc) + (k
z)′(1 + µ) =

(kz + Γz) (1 + r(1− τk)) + 2gz + Y L, if j < 65
(kz + Γz) (1 + r(1− τk)) + 2gz + 2Ψ z, if j ≥ 65
Y L =
(
Y L,m + Y L,w
) (
1− τss − τMl (x)
(
Y L,m + Y L,w
))
+
(
1− 1[nw>0]
)
T
Y L,ι =
niwz,ι (aι, eι, uι)
1 + τ˜ss
, ι = m,w
(em)′ = j + 1, (ew)′ = ew + 1[nw>0],
nm ∈ (0, 1], nw ∈ [0, 1], (kz)′ ≥ 0, cz > 0,
nι = 0 if j ≥ 65, ι = m,w.
Y L is the household’s labor income composed of the labor incomes of the two spouses,
which they receive during the active phase of their life, τss and τ˜ss are the social security
contributions paid by the employee and by the employer. The problem of a single household
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can be written:
V S(kz, e,u, a, ι, j) = max
cz ,(kz)′,n
[
U (c, n)
+ β(1−M(j))Eu′
[
V S((kz)′, e′, u′, a, ι, j + 1)
]
+ βM(j)E(kz)′,e−ι,(um)′,(uw)′,a−ι,x′
[
V M((kz)′, (ew)′, (um)′, (uw)′, am, aw, x′, j + 1)
]]
s.t.:
cz(1 + τc) + (k
z)′(1 + µ) =

(kz + Γz) (1 + r(1− τk)) + gz + Y L, if j < 65
(kz + Γz) (1 + r(1− τk)) + gz + Ψ z, if j ≥ 65
Y L =
(
Y L,ι
) (
1− τss − τSl
(
Y L,ι
))
+
(
1− 1[nw>0]
)
T
Y L,ι =
nιwz,ι (aι, eι, uι)
1 + τ˜ss
, ι = m,w
(em)′ = em + 1, (ew)′ = ew + 1[nw>0],
nm ∈ (0, 1], nw ∈ [0, 1], (kz)′ ≥ 0, cz > 0,
nι = 0 if j ≥ 65, ι = m,w.
3.7 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
We call an equilibrium of the growth adjusted economy a stationary equilibrium.16 Let
ΦM(kz, ew, um, uw, am, aw, x, j) be the measure of married households with the corresponding
characteristics and ΦS(kz, e, u, a, ι, j) be the measure of single households. We now define
such a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium as follows:
Definition:
1. The value functions V M(ΦM) and V S(ΦS) and policy functions, cz(ΦM), kz(ΦM),
nm(ΦM), nw(ΦM), c(ΦS), k(ΦS), and n(ΦS) solve the consumers’ optimization problem
given the factor prices and initial conditions.
16the associated BGP can of course trivially be constructed by scaling all appropriate variables by the
growth factor Zt.
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2. Markets clear:
Kz +Bz =
∫
kzdΦM +
∫
kzdΦM
Lz =
∫ (
nmwzm + nwwzf
)
dΦM +
∫
(nwz) dΦS∫
czdΦM +
∫
czdΦS + (µ+ δ)Kz +Gz = (Kz)α (Lz)1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
wz = (1− α)
(
Kz
Lz
)α
r = α
(
Kz
Lz
)α−1
− δ
4. The government budget balances:
gz
(
2
∫
dΦM +
∫
dΦS
)
+
∫
j<65,n=0
T zdΦM +
∫
j<65,n=0
T zdΦS +Gz + (r − µ)Bz
=
∫ (
τkr(k
z + Γz) + τcc
z + τl
(
nmwmz + nwwwz
1 + τ˜ss
))
dΦM
+
∫ (
τkr(k
z + Γz) + τcc
z + τl
(
nwz
1 + τ˜ss
))
dΦS
5. The social security system balances:
Ψz
(∫
j≥65
dΦM+
∫
j≥65
dΦS
)
=
τ˜ss + τss
1 + τ˜ss
(∫
j<65
(nmwmz+nwwwz)dΦM+
∫
j<65
nwzdΦS
)
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γz
(∫
ω(j)dΦM +
∫
ω(j)dΦS
)
=
∫
(1− ω(j)) kzdΦM +
∫
(1− ω(j)) kzdΦS
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4 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model parameters. We calibrate our model
to match the appropriate moments from the U.S. data. We use data from 2001 - 2007,
because our tax data start in 2001 and we want to avoid the business cycle effects during
the great recession starting in 2008. Many parameters can be calibrated to direct empirical
counterparts without solving the model. They are listed in Table 2. The 10 parameters
in Table 3 below are, however, calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method of
moments (SMM) approach.
4.1 Preferences
The momentary utility functions are given in equations 7 and 8. The discount factor, β,
the means and variances of the fixed costs of working, µFMw , µFSw , σ
2
FMw and σ
2
FSw , and
the disutility parameters of working more hours, χMm, χMw, χSm and χSw, are among the
parameters found through SMM. The corresponding data moments are the ratio of capital
to output, K/Y , taken from the BEA, the employment rates of married and single females
(age 20-64), taken from the CPS, the persistence of labor force participation of married and
single females (age 20-64)17, taken from the PSID, and hours worked per person aged 20-64
by marital status and gender, taken from the CPS.
There is considerable debate in the economic literature about the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, see Keane (2011) for a thorough survey. However, there seem to be consensus
that female labor supply is much more elastic than male labor supply. We set 1/ηm = 0.4
which is in line with contemporary literature, see for instance Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura
(2011). 1/ηw we set to 0.8. Note that 1/ηf is here to be interpreted as the intensive margin
Frisch elasticity of female labor supply, while 1/ηm is the Frisch elasticity of male labor
supply. The 1/η parameters should generally not be interpreted as the macro elasticity of
labor labor supply with respect to tax rates, see Keane and Rogerson (2012).
17Measured as the R2 from regressing this year’s participation status on last year’s participation status.
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4.2 Technology
In line with contemporary literature, we set the capital share parameter, α, equal to 1/3.
The depreciation rate is set to match an investment-capital ratio of 9.88% in the data.
4.3 Wages
We estimate the age profile for male wages, the experience profile for female wages, and the
processes for the idiosyncratic shocks exogenously, using the PSID from 1968-1997. After
1997, it is not possible to get years of actual labor market experience from the PSID. Ap-
pendix 9.4 describes the estimation procedure in more detail. We use a 2-step approach
to control for selection into the labor market, as described in Heckman (1976) and Heck-
man (1979). After estimating the returns to age/experience for men/women, we obtain the
residuals from the estimations and use the panel data structure of the PSID to estimate the
parameters for the productivity shock processes, ρι and σι, and the variance of individual
abilities, σαι , by fixed effects estimation. We normalize the parameter, γ0w to 1 and calibrate
the parameter γ0m, internally in the model. The corresponding data moment is the ratio
between male and female earnings.
4.4 Taxes and Social Security
As described in Section 2 we apply the labor income tax function in 1, proposed by Benabou
(2002). We use U.S. labor income tax data provided by the OECD to estimate the parameters
θ0 and θ1 for different family types. Table 5 in the Appendix summarizes our findings for
different countries. Table 7 displays the share of labor income taxes paid by different income
deciles in our US benchmark economy.
We assume that the social security contributions for the employee, τSS, and the employer,
τ˜SS are flat taxes, which is close to true. We use the rate from the bracket covering most
incomes, 7.65% for both τSS and τ˜SS. We follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and set τk = 36%
and τc = 5%.
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4.5 Transition Between Family Types
We assume that there are four family types: (1) single individuals with no children, (2)
married couples with no children; (3) married couples with 1 child; (4) married couples
with 2 children. To calculate age-dependent probabilities of transitions between married
and single, we use the US data from the CPS (March supplement) covering years 1999 to
2001. We assume a stationary environment where the probabilities of transitioning between
the family types does not change over time. More precisely, we allow these probabilities
to depend on the individual’s age, but not on her cohort. Denoting the shares of married
and divorced individuals at age j by M¯(j) and D¯(j), we compute the probability of getting
married at age j, M(j), and the probability of getting divorced, D(j), from the following
transition equations:
M¯(j + 1) = (1− M¯(j))M(j) + M¯(j)(1−D(j)),
D¯(j + 1) = D¯(j)(1−M(j)) + M¯(j)D(j).
As mentioned above, we assume that only married couples have children. To compute the
probabilities of transitioning between 0, 1 and 2 children, we use the NLS data that follows
individuals over the period from 1979 to 2010. Since it is a panel data set, we can compute the
age-dependent probabilities of switching between 0, 1 and 2 children as households age over
this period. Newly wed households draw their number of children from the unconditional
age-dependent distribution.
4.6 Death Probabilities and Transfers
We obtain the probability that a retiree will survive to the next period from the National
Center for Health Statistics.
People who do not work have other source of income such as unemployment benefits,
social aid, gifts from relatives and charities, black market work etc. They do also have
more time for home production (not included in the model). Pinning down the consumption
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Table 3: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description Moment Moment Value
γ0m -1.189 wt(ai, ei, ui) = wte
ai+γ0w+γ1wei+γ2we
2
i+γ3we
3
i+ui Gender earnings ratio 1.569
β 1.008 Discount factor K/Y 2.640
µFMw -0.045 F
Mw ∼ N(µFMw , σ2FMw) Married fem employment 0.676
σFMw 0.165 U
M(c, nm, nw) = log(c)− χMm (nm)1+η
m
1+ηm
− R2 from 1[nt>0] = ρ0 + ρ11[nt−1>0] 0.553
χMw 4.140 χMw (n
w)1+η
w
1+ηw
− FMw · 1[nw>0] Married female hours 0.224 (1225 h/year)
χMm 20.600 Married male hours 0.360 (1965 h/year)
µFSw -0.047 F
Sw ∼ N(µFSw , σ2SMw) Single fem. employment 0.760
σFSw 0.261 U
S(c, n, ι) = log(c)− χSι (n)1+η
ι
1+ηι
R2 from 1[nt>0] = ρ0 + ρ11[nt−1>0] 0.463
χSw 8.710 −F Sι · 1[n>0] Single female hours 0.251 (1371 h/year)
χSm 65.300 Single male hours 0.282 (1533 h/year)
equivalent of income when not working is a difficult task. The number we land on will also
clearly affect the size of the fixed costs of working, which we calibrate to hit the employment
rate for women by marital status. As an approximation for income when not working, we
take the average value of non-housing consumption of households with income less than $5000
per year from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. When we perform policy experiments we
keep income when not working as a constant fraction of the income of those who work.
To determine the spending on pure public consumption G we follow Prescott (2004)
and assume that government expenditure on pure public consumption goods is equal to
2 times expenditure on national defense. In addition the government must pay interest
on the national debt before the remaining tax revenues can be redistributed lump sum to
households.
4.7 Estimation Method
Ten model parameters are calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method of mo-
ments approach. We minimize the squared percentage deviation of simulated model statistics
from the ten data moments in column 3 of Table 3. Let Θ = {γ0m, β, µFMw , σFMw , χMw, χMm,
µFSw , σFSw , χ
Sw, χSm} and let V (Θ) = (V1(Θ), . . . , V10(Θ))′ denote the vector where Vi(Θ) =
(m¯i − mˆi(Θ))/m¯i is the percentage difference between empirical moments and simulated
moments. Then:
Vˆ = min
Θ
V (Θ)′V (Θ) (9)
Table 3 summarizes the estimated parameter values and the data moments. We match all
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the moments exactly so that V (Θ)′V (Θ) = 0.
5 Computational Experiments
This section concisely describes our counterfactual experiments in Sections 6 and 7. We
start by calibrating the model to data from the U.S. (and in Section 7 Germany). We then
perform the following exercises, in order to make the points that a) the progressivity of the
tax code is a key determinant of the shape of the Laffer curve, and that b) the precise form of
household heterogeneity present in the model is crucial for the quantitative magnitude of the
impact of tax progressivity on the Laffer curve. The latter point is important since coutries
differ significantly along this dimension and therefore the extent to which progressivity is
crucial for tax revenues (and thus the Laffer curve) will vary across countries as well.
The quantitative analysis therefore proceeds in the following steps:
1. For a given model and given progressivity of the tax code defined by the parameter θ1
we derive the Laffer curve by scaling up the tax level (which can be adjusted by θ0) for
all family types by the same constant and plotting BGP tax revenue against the level
of taxes. We study the importance of the progressivity of the income tax code for the
Laffer curve by tracing out Laffer curves for different degrees of progressivity θ1. In
section 6.1 we trace out U.S. Laffer curves under the assumption that additional tax
revenue is transfered back to households in a lump-sum fashion (we call them g-Laffer
curves). Section 6.2 does the same, but under the assumption that the additional
tax revenue is used to service a larger stock of outstanding government debt (we call
them b-Laffer curves), thereby also characterizing the maximal sustainable stock of
government debt.
One should note that while in the representative agent setting, g- and b-Laffer curves
coincide (see Feve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2013)), in a model with heterogeneous agents
and incomplete asset markets, they are different. Going from g-Laffer curves to b-Laffer
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curves, one can expect three effects on the tax revenues: i) Smaller lump-sum transfers
from the government back to the households mean smaller negative income effect on
the labor supply (this can lead to larger effects on tax revenues from the changes
in the tax level and / or tax progressivity). ii) An increase in public debt crowds
out physical capital, raising the equilibrium interest rate and lowering the equilibrium
wages, thereby reducing the labor income tax base (this can lead to smaller effects on
tax revenues from the change in the tax level in or tax progressivity). iii) The extra
debt is being held by households who get more capital income and pay more capital
taxes (this can lead to larger effects on tax revenues from the changes in the tax level
and / or tax progressivity).
2. We then investigate the importance of the form and size of household heterogeneity
for the impact of tax progressivity on tax revenues. In a first step, carried out in
section 6.3, we show, for a fixed degree of tax progressivity θ1, what forms of household
heterogeneities impact Laffer curves the most, in a quantitative sense. To do so we
display Laffer curves for a sequence of models, starting with Trabandt and Uhlig’s
(2011) representative agent model and ending with our benchmark life cycle economy
with ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity as well as explicit family structure and extensive
margin labor supply margin of females. In a second step, in section 6.4 we then study
the interaction between tax progressivity and household heterogeneity by displaying
how maximal tax revenue and debt levels depend on the progressivity of the tax code
in a selection of models that differ in the way and the degree to which households are
heterogeneous. It should be noted that the Laffer curves in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 have
the sum of revenue from social security taxes and other taxes on the x-axis. This is
to allow for a comparison between life-cycle models and infinite horizon models, which
do not have a social security system.
3. Finally, we draw out the implications of these findings for Laffer curves across coun-
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tries. Cross-country differences in the tax code (especially its progressivity, but also
its structure - labor, capital and consumption taxes) and the magnitude of house-
hold heterogeneity are the key drivers of cross-country differences in Laffer curves.
We demonstrate this claim in section 7 by comparing Laffer curves for the U.S. and
Germany, decomposing the importance of both factors by first subjecting our model
calibrated to the U.S. data to a tax code with German progressivity level, and then by
re-calibrating the model fully to German micro data and drawing Laffer curves for a
tax code with U.S. progressivity level.
6 The Impact of Tax Progressivity and Household Het-
erogeneity on the Laffer Curve
In this section we display the main quantitative results of our paper, with respect to the
impact of tax progressivity and household heterogeneity on the Laffer curve. We trace out
the Laffer curve under two different assumptions about the use of revenues. In the first
specification (g-curves), we assume that the increase in revenue is redistributed evenly to all
households. In the second specification (b-curves), we assume that the increase in revenue
is spent on paying interest on debt.
We find that more progressive taxes significantly shift the Laffer curve downwards and
reduce the maximum sustainable debt level. The impact of progressivity on revenue is quite
robust to the use of revenue18 We also find that various types of heterogeneity is important
for the maximal revenue that can be raised and the location of the peak of the Laffer curve.
6.1 The Impact of Tax Progressivity
In this subsection we characterize U.S. Laffer curves under the assumption that the increase
in revenue is redistributed uniformly to all households. This is similar to Trabandt and Uhlig
18As a last robustness check we also trace out Laffer curves where additional revenue is wasted, we call
them s-curve, and find that the impact of progressivity is similar to what we find for g- curves and b-curves,
see Table 8.
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(2011), and we denote these Laffer curves g-curves. We vary the progressivity of the labor
income tax schedule, as defined by 2, by multiplying θ1 for all family types by the same
constant and we change the tax level while holding progressivity constant by multiplying θ0
for all family types by the same constant.
Figure 2: The Impact of Tax Progressivity on the Laffer Curve (holding debt to GDP
constant)
In Figure 2, we plot Laffer curves for our simulated US economy for varying degrees of
progressivity. At the moment the US is relatively far from the peak of its Laffer curve19.
With the current progressivity of the tax system, tax revenues can be increased by about 57%
if the average tax rate on labor income is raised from 17% today to about 58%. Figure 12
in the Appendix provides a break down of the revenue from labor, consumption and capital
taxes along the Laffer curve. Figures 10 and 11 show how different labor market statistics
vary along the Laffer curve.
We observe that the design of the tax system has considerable impact on the Laffer curve.
The maximal revenue that can be raised with a flat tax system is about 6% higher than the
maximal revenue that can be raised when the tax schedule exhibits a progressivity similar to
the current US system. A tax schedule with the current US progressivity can again raise 8%
19The current US benchmark result corresponds to the diamond on the black solid line.
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more revenue than a tax system which is twice as progressive, or similar to the tax system
in Denmark20. Table 4 shows how progressivity affects revenue at different average tax rates
relative to the revenue that could be raised with the current U.S. progressivity of the tax
system and relative to the benchmark calibration with 17.5% average tax rate. The impact
of progressivity is slightly higher at higher average tax rates.
Table 4: The Impact of Progressivity at Different Tax Rates
τ¯(y) = 17.5% τ¯(y) = 25% τ¯(y) = 35%
Prog. = Xθ1US
TR
TRBench
TR(prog=X)
TR(prog=1)
TR
RBench
TR(prog=X)
TR(prog=1)
TR
RBench
TR(prog=X)
TR(prog=1)
0.0 104.6 104.6 123.5 104.8 143.9 105.2
1.0 100.0 100.0 117.8 100.0 136.8 100.0
2.0 93.7 93.7 110.1 93.5 127.5 93.2
3.0 85.2 85.2 100.1 84.9 115.6 84.5
Figure 2 also allows us to assess how important is tax progressivity relative to the tax
level in achieving the maximum labor income tax revenues. Let TRcur be the tax revenues
that correspond to the current labor income tax level in the US (marked by a red dot in the
figure), TRlevel be the maximum tax revenues that can be attained by changing the tax level
but keeping the progressivity as it is now in the US (which corresponds to the top of the “1 x
US prog.” curve), and finally let TRprog be the maximum tax revenues one can achieve with
flat taxes (which corresponds to the top of the “Flat tax” curve in the figure). Then the total
maximum change in tax revenues is ∆Total = TRprog−TRcur = (1.57 ·1.06−1)TRcur, while
the change that is due to modifying the tax progressivity is ∆Prog = TRprog − TRlevel =
TRprog − TRlevel = (1.57 · 1.06 − 1.57)TRcur. This means that the potential changes due
to modifying the progressivity of the tax code, ∆Prog, can account for up to 14.2% of all
additional tax revenues one could achieve when changing the current US labor tax system
to the one that results in the highest tax revenues, changing both the tax level and tax
progressivity.21
20Note that the Danish tax system is generally more progressive than the US tax system, however, as we
scale the progressivity of the US system we will never obtain a system exactly equal to the Danish system
since the U.S. and Danish systems also differ in the relative tax burdens of different family types.
21Imposing the restriction that the tax system remains in the class of tax functions that we consider in
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Table 9 displays different model statistics for 3 different levels of progressivity at 17.5%22,
25% and 35% average labor income tax rate. As one can can see from the table, for a given tax
level, a more progressive tax schedule leads to lower aggregate labor supply and savings. This
is the reason for why a more progressive tax system gives smaller revenues. It is interesting
to note that the progressivity of the tax system has a strong impact on female labor force
participation and that this impact is completely opposite for married and single women.
Women are often low earners and for single women a more progressive tax system increases
the benefits from work. This illustrates the potential positive effect of higher progressivity
on the labor force participation of low-earners discussed in section 1. Married women are
on the other hand taxed jointly with their husbands. If the husband is a high earner, the
additional benefits from the wife participating in the labor force will be smaller with a more
progressive tax system.
Table 10 displays different model statistics for 3 different progressivity levels while holding
θ0 in the tax function constant at the levels which give 17.5%, 25% and 35% average tax
with US tax progressivity. As can be seen from the table, starting at a given average tax
level close to the current tax level in the US (17.5%), there is some but limited potential for
raising more revenues by making the tax system more progressive following this approach.
However, at the higher tax rates, this potential disappears. For instance, starting from a
35% average labor income tax rate and the same tax progressivity as in the US and then
making the tax system twice as progressive reduces tax revenues even if the average tax rate
increases to 38%.
6.2 The Impact of Tax Progressivity on Sustainable Debt
In the left panel of Figure 3, we plot Laffer curves for our simulated US economy under the
assumption that the increase in revenue (again brought about by an increase in θ0) is spent
on paying interest on debt. We call these b-Laffer curves. Government spending, G, and
this paper.
22The benchmark tax level
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lump sum transfers, g are kept at their benchmark levels in this exercise.
The peak of the Laffer curve is higher when we instead of redistributing revenues spend
them on paying off debt. The positive income effect on labor supply and the effect of
increased capital taxes paid by the debt holders are dominating the effect of debt crowding
out productive capital. For the current choice of progressivity, the US can increase it’s
revenue by about 101% if the average labor income tax rate is increased to about 56%. Also
for the b-laffer curves, a more progressive tax system significantly reduces revenue. The
maximal revenue that can be raised with a flat tax system is about 8% higher than the
maximal revenue that can be raised when the tax schedule exhibits a progressivity similar
to the current US system. A tax schedule with the current US progressivity can again raise
10% more revenue than a tax system which is twice as progressive
Figure 3: Tax Revenue and Maximum Sustainable Debt Level by Tax Level and Progressivity
In the right panel of Figure 3 we plot the maximum sustainable debt level as a func-
tion of the average tax rate for varying degrees of progressivity. For it’s current choice of
progressivity, the US can sustain a debt burden of about 3.4 times it’s benchmark GDP by
increasing the average tax rate to 47%. This is consistent with the fact that the interest
rate on US debt in international bond markets is still relatively low, although in recent years
(after the calibration period) the US debt has risen to 120% of GDP. We observe that one
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also can sustain more debt with a less progressive tax system. Converting to a flat tax
system increases the maximum sustainable debt by 10% whereas converting to a twice as
progressive tax system reduces the maximum sustainable debt by 12%. The tax rate, which
maximizes debt is substantially lower than the tax rate which maximizes revenue. This is
due to general equilibrium effects. As the debt level increases, the capital stock becomes
smaller, the interest rate increases and it becomes more expensive to hold debt.
Table 8 provides a robustness check with respect to how the use of additional tax revenue
affects the impact of progressivity on the peak of the Laffer curve. In addition to g-curves
and b-curves we draw s-curves, where additional tax revenue beyond the benchmark level is
assumed to be waisted. As can be seen from the right column of the table, the impact of
progressivity in % is relatively robust to the use of revenue. The level of the Laffer curve is,
however, strongly affected by the use of revenue, as can be seen from the middle column.
6.3 The Impact of Household Heterogeneity
In this section we analyze how the shape of the Laffer curve depends on different types of
household heterogeneity. To do this, we consider several alternative models. We start with
our model from section 3, and then remove some of its key features, such as participation
margin, returns to experience, life-cycle profiles, and agent heterogeneity in permanent abili-
ties and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, finally arriving at the representative agent model
analyzed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
To facilitate comparison between models with infinitely lived agents and models with a
life-cycle, in this section we consider Laffer curves for which the tax revenue includes the
revenue from the social security taxes and we focus on g-curves23. This allows us to compare
our findings to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) who use the same approach. We also assume that
taxes are flat (no progressivity) in all models in this section.
In the left Panel of Figure 4 we graph 6 g-Laffer curves. The green line is the Laffer curve
23In the previous sections we kept social security taxes separate, because in reality they are a separate
system. They are not part of the government budget and cannot be spent on paying down government debt.
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Figure 4: Laffer Curves for Different Models With Flat Taxes
from our original model. The green dashed line is from the full model without the extensive
margin and human capital accumulation for women. The green dotted line is from the full
model with extensive margin, however, instead of endogenous experience accumulation there
is an exogenous age-dependent wage profile. The blue dashed line and the blue solid line
are from the representative agent model of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). In the solid line
we use their code but parameter values similar to those used in our study. In particular
we set the parameter η which governs the Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to 1/0.6,
the average of what we use for men and women in the full model. The dotted blue line is
from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)’s original calibration with η = 1. The red dashed line is
the Laffer curve from a single-household life-cycle model with heterogeneity in permanent
abilities and idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Among the Laffer curves with η = 1/0.6, the one for the full model stands out as by
far the lowest. This is as expected because it has both extensive margin labor supply and
human capital for females. Between these two model elements the human capital effect is,
however, the main driver of the level of the Laffer curve. Higher taxes reduce female labor
force participation, which again lowers their productivity due to the loss of human capital.
Introducing an extensive margin in female labor supply while keeping the age-profile of
32
female wages constant also lowers the Laffer curve due to more elastic labor supply, however,
the effect is much larger when female wages depend on experience.
Whether one uses an infinite horizon model or a single household life-cycle model with or
without heterogeneity in shocks and permanent abilities has very little effect on the Laffer
curve, see the right panel of Figure 4. This is in line with Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), who
found that augmenting their representative agent with household heterogeneity did not have
much of an effect on the Laffer curve.
As one would expect, the η parameter, which in the representative agent model is equal to
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, has a large impact on the Laffer curve, see
the left panel of Figure 14 in the Appendix. In the representative agent model with η = 1/0.4,
which would be considered relatively conservative, the US can increase it’s revenue to almost
160% of benchmark by increasing the average tax rate to about 78%. With η = 1/1.5, the
Laffer curve peaks at 58% and the maximum revenue is only 120% of benchmark. In the left
panel of Figure 4 the difference between the the blue dotted line and blue solid line is due
to increasing this parameter from 1 to 1/0.6. The fact that our heterogeneous agent model,
which is calibrated with ηm = 1/0.4 and ηf = 1/0.8 produce a Laffer curve close to the same
level as the representative agent model with η = 1, illustrates that ”macro” and ”micro”
elasticities of labor supply are two different concepts24, although the main explanation is the
human capital effect.
In Figure 15 in the Appendix we plot b-Laffer curves and maximal sustainable debt
levels from different models. We only display results for life-cycle models, which has a social
security system. The results are relatively similar to the ones for g-curves. The full model
with endogenous human capital and extensive margin labor supply for females generates
less revenue and can sustain less debt compared to benchmark GDP. Income heterogeneity
matters slightly more for the maximum sustainable debt level than for revenue, although the
24Micro estimates of the Hicksian or Marshallian elasticity of labor supply have usually been based on
the change in individual intensive margin labor supply from one year to the next. The ”macro” elasticity
between two steady states also takes into account the change in the population’s labor force participation
due to a tax change.
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effect is small. The sustainable debt level is lower in the single household life-cycle model
with heterogeneity in permanent abilities and idiosyncratic shocks than in the life-cycle
model without other heterogeneity than age.
6.4 The Interaction Between Heterogeneity and Progressivity
In the left panel of Figure 5 we plot the peak of the Laffer g-curves as a function of tax
progressivity in different models; our benchmark heterogeneous agents model, a model which
is identical to the benchmark model except that female human capital is age-dependent and
exogenous, a model which is identical to the exogenous human capital model except that it
lacks extensive margin labor supply for females, a representative agent model, and a single
household life-cycle model.
The negative impact of progressivity on tax revenue is the smallest in our full model
and the largest in the single household life-cycle and representative agent models. Adding
family-type heterogeneity (No extensive margin) reduces the impact of progressivity. This
is driven by progressive taxation being less distortionary on the intensive margin of labor
supply for 2-earner households, when they are taxed jointly25, which is the case in the US. To
see this, compare the first order condition for a married individual (in this case the female)
to the first order condition for a single individual. For a married female, the first order
condition with respect to labor would read:
u′cwf (1− (τ + θ0θ1(
wmnm + wfnf
AE
)−θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax wedge
) = −u′n (10)
The first order condition for a single female would read:
u′cwf (1− (τ + θ0θ1(
wfnf
AE
)−θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax wedge
) = −u′n (11)
Thus the distortionary tax wedge is smaller for married couples under joint taxation.
25This may be an argument for joint taxation of married couples if the tax system is highly progressive.
However, it should be noted that the effect on the extensive margin tends to go in the opposite direction.
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Adding an extensive margin of female labor supply (Exog. human capital) increases the
impact of progressivity, as some women are pushed over the margin. However, introducing
endogenous human capital accumulation again (Full model) significantly reduces the impact
of tax progressivity. This is because labor supply becomes much more inelastic around the
extensive margin. From Table 9 one can see that female LFP tends to be slightly higher
when taxes are more progressive in the full model.
Figure 5: The Impact of Tax Progressivity on Maximum Revenue in Different Models
It should be noted here that the finding that introducing endogenous human capital
accumulation reduces the impact of tax progressivity may depend crucially on how human
capital accumulation is modeled. When human capital is modeled as years of labor market
experience, making taxes more progressive increases the short term benefit of acquiring
human capital. This effect counteracts the effect from progressive taxes reducing the longer
time returns to human capital. Progressive taxation in this context only affects the human
capital accumulation decisions of those on the margin between working and not working.
These are usually low earners and will get a higher net wage (at least in the short run) when
taxes become more progressive. If human capital was rather modeled as an investment of
money in education quality or as a time-investment in learning, the introduction of human
capital may instead increase the importance of tax progressivity26.
26See Holter (2014) for a model where human capital accumulation is modeled as a continuous investment
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We conjecture that one may approximate the level of the Laffer curve relatively well with
a representative agent model, which has the ”right” elasticity of labor supply. By ”right”
in this context we mean that labor supply must be made sufficiently elastic to make up for
the human capital effect which is not present in the representative agent model27. However,
as figure 5 shows, the effect of changing the progressivity of the tax system would not be
captured very well by a representative agent model, no matter the elasticity of labor supply.
Since tax progressivity differs among countries, the representative agent model with a fixed
η would also not be well-suited for cross-country comparisons of Laffer curves.
The right panel of Figure 14 in the Appendix illustrates how the impact of progressivity
changes when changing the elasticity of labor supply in a representative agent model. We
observe that the negative impact of progressivity on revenue is greater when the elasticity of
labor supply is higher. However, even for low labor supply elasticity going from a flat tax to a
tax system which is 3 times more progressive than the current US system, lowers the peak of
the Laffer curve by an amount equal to 30% of benchmark revenue. The impact of changing
the elasticity of labor supply on the cost of tax progressivity is relatively small compared
to the impact of introducing model elements such as 2-earner households, extensive margin
labor supply and human capital.
There is very little interaction between the impact of tax progressivity on revenue and
income inequality modeled as variation in permanent abilities or idiosyncratic shocks, see
the right panel of figure 5. This may imply that societies with higher ex-ante inequality
should choose a more progressive tax system because the gains from redistribution would
be higher in such a society. This conclusion would as we have seen also hold up if higher
inequality was due to greater returns to experience but perhaps not if inequality was due to
higher returns to education.
of money in education quality and Badel and Huggett (2014b) for a model where human capital accumulation
is modeled as investment of time in learning. Both of these studies apply a Ben-Porath (1967) human capital
production technology.
27In figure 13 we plot Laffer curves for the benchmark model and a representative agent model wit η set
to generate the same implied labor supply elasticity after a productivity shock. As can be seen from the
figure the resulting Laffer curve in the representative agent model is far higher than in the full model.
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In Figures 17 and 18 in the Appendix we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to
the interaction between income heterogeneity and progressivity. We plot maximum revenue,
the revenue maximizing tax rate, labor supply in hours at the revenue maximizing point and
labor supply in efficiency units of labor at the revenue maximizing point in a single household
life-cycle model with and without heterogeneity in abilities and idiosyncratic shocks. We
perform the exercise using log utility with very low, medium and very high elasticity of
labor supply, constant relative risk aversion utility with σ = 4 and η = 1/0.6, Cobb-Douglas
utility, and Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman utility.28 With all these specifications, income
heterogeneity has very little impact on the Laffer curve.
Figure 16 in the Appendix displays the impact of tax progressivity on maximum revenue
and maximum sustainable debt in different models29. The results are qualitatively similar
to the results for g-curves. The impact of progressivity is the largest in the single-household
life-cycle model. Progressivity matters less when we model family-type heterogeneity, more
when we introduce extensive margin labor supply and less when we introduce endogenous
human capital. Heterogeneity plays some but limited impact for the level of debt that can be
sustained. With more heterogeneity, agents on average increase savings relatively less as the
interest rate increases along the Laffer curve. The result is that the interest rate increases
relatively faster in the economy with more heterogeneity and less debt can be sustained.
7 International Laffer Curves
In this section we derive the implications of our previous findings for the international com-
parison of tax revenues. Cross-country differences in the tax code (labor income tax progres-
sivity, but also capital and consumption taxes) and the magnitude of household heterogeneity
and thus inequality are the key drivers of cross-country differences in Laffer curves. In this
section we demonstrate this by example. First in Section 7.1, we insert the tax system from
28Since all utility specifications do not admit a balanced growth path we abstract from technological
progress in this analysis.
29Again we only display results for life-cycle models.
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some of our countries in Table 1 into the U.S. and draw Laffer curves. Next in Section 7.2 we
compare the Laffer curves for the U.S. and Germany. We choose Germany for two reasons:
first, it offers micro wage data (through the German Socio-Economic Panel, GSOEP) that
are directly comparable to the American PSID, and second, the differences in the structure
of the tax and transfer system between the U.S. and Germany are very substantial, making
this cross-country comparison an ideal test case for our theory.
7.1 Maximum Tax Revenue and Tax Progressivity Across Countries
In Figure 6 we plot the maximum tax revenues that can be obtained if we insert the tax
system from some of the countries in Table 1 into the U.S. and increase the average tax rate
while holding progressivity constant at the country-specific level30. As can be seen from the
figure, there is a negative relationship between tax progressivity and the maximum revenue
that can be raise across countries. With U.S. tax progressivity it is possible to increase
revenue by about 57% relative to the benchmark economy. With a tax progressivity similar
to Japan, the U.S. could increase revenue by 61%, whereas with tax progressivity similar to
Denmark it could only increase revenue by 45%.
Figure 6: Maximum Tax Revenue vs. Tax Progressivity Across Countries
30When we change the tax system, we change both the tax progressivity and the relative tax burden on
different family types.
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7.2 A Comparison of Laffer Curves for the U.S. and Germany
In a first step we now introduce a tax system with German progressivity in our U.S. cali-
brated economy. In Figure 7, we draw Laffer curves (with extra revenues transferred back
to households, i.e. g-curves) for U.S. labor income tax progressivity (the benchmark model)
and German labor income tax progressivity. The dots on the curves marks the current tax
level in the two countries. As expected, the Laffer curve for the more progressive tax system
with progressivity similar to Germany lays below our Laffer curve with U.S. progressivity
level. With U.S tax progressivity one can increase tax revenues to 157% of the benchmark
value in the U.S., whereas with German tax progressivity (applied to the U.S. economy) one
can only raise 150% of benchmark revenue.
Figure 7: Laffer Curves With German Taxes
To investigate the impact of the wage distribution, in a second step we substitute the
exogenously estimated U.S. wage process from the PSID with its German equivalent from
the GSOEP and we replace the U.S. calibration target for the ratio between male and female
wages with its German equivalent, see Tables 11 and 12. The tax system and all the other
data moments are left unchanged during the calibration. In Figure 8 we plot Laffer curves
for this economy with U.S. tax progressivity and German tax progressivity. The difference
between the two Laffer curves is similar to the benchmark economy. Both Laffer curves
are, however, shifted down by about five percentage points. With U.S. tax progressivity
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and German wages one can raise 154% of benchmark revenue, whereas with German tax
progressivity one can only raise 147% of benchmark revenue. One reason for why the Laffer
curve shifts down with a German wage structure is the larger gender wage gap in Germany,
which causes women to drop out faster from the labor force as one increases the level of
taxes.
Figure 8: g-Laffer Curves from a Calibration with German Wage Distribution
Finally we re-calibrate the entire model to German data. Relative to U.S. fiscal policy,
the German tax system is characterized by different family specific labor income taxes (see
Table 5), a 23% capital tax, compared to 36% for the U.S., and a 15% consumption tax,
compared to 5% for the U.S. The employee and employer social security taxes, τss, and τ˜ss
are approximated as flat taxes, with a rate that is equal to the contribution by a person
with average income. The German social security rates are τss = 17.1%, and τ˜ss = 17.6%,
compared to τss = τ˜ss = 7.7% for the U.S. Germany also has different marriage and divorce
rates, fertility rates and different labor market calibration targets. Tables 12 and 11 in the
Appendix summarize the German calibration.
In Figure 9 we plot Laffer curves for our German economy with German labor income
tax progressivity and with U.S. progressivity. As can be seen from the figure, Germany
has a much smaller potential for raising revenue through increased labor income taxation
than the U.S. The main reason is that Germany already has much higher consumption- and
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Figure 9: g-Laffer Curves from a Model Calibrated to Germany
social security taxes and therefore cannot raise that much more additional revenue through
increasing the labor income tax level. Changing to a less progressive tax system increases
revenue even more in Germany than in the U.S., however. With U.S. tax progressivity,
Germany can maximally raise 128% of their current revenue through increasing labor income
taxes. With German progressivity level, the corresponding number is 119%. Thus, an
important lesson from the cross-country analysis is that countries (such as Germany) with
higher social security and consumption taxes face substantially tighter limits to their ability
for generating extra revenue from labor income tax reform.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we quantify how much revenue the U.S. can raise and how much debt it can
sustain through increasing labor income taxes, and we study the impact of tax progressivity
and household heterogeneity on the Laffer curve. The U.S. is currently far from the peak
of its Laffer curve and could increase tax revenue by about 57% if the average labor income
tax rate is increased to about 58%.
More progressive taxes significantly reduce tax revenue. Because, as we document, there
is substantial variation in tax progressivity across countries, tax progressivity is important
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for international comparisons of Laffer curves. To quantify the effect of tax progressivity on
the Laffer curve it is important to model family-heterogeneity, extensive margin labor supply
and endogenous human capital accumulation. These model elements also significantly affect
the level of the Laffer curve. Relative to simple life-cycle or representative agent models,
with joint taxation, the labor supply of couples is less elastic to changes in tax progressivity
along the intensive margin. Adding an extensive margin and endogenous accumulation of
labor market experience also reduces the elasticity of labor supply to tax progressivity.
Income heterogeneity, modeled as permanent abilities or idiosyncratic wage shocks, have
very little impact on the Laffer curve in simple life-cycle and representative agent models31.
From a welfare perspective this may imply that countries with more ex-ante heterogeneity
should choose a more progressive tax system, as the redistributive benefits are larger and the
cost in terms of lost tax revenue approximately equal. The natural next question, deferred to
future work, that emerges is then to what extent differential household heterogeneity across
countries can account for the observed cross-country differences in income tax progressivity.
9 Appendix
9.1 Balanced growth with labor participation margin
As is well-known32, for balanced growth we need to assume labor-augmenting technological
progress. In this case, consumption, investment, output and capital all grow at the rate of
labor-augmenting technical progress, while hours worked remain constant. King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (2002) show that the momentary preferences that deliver first-order optimality
conditions consistent with these requirements can take one of the following two forms:
31In the full model there would be more complex interactions between these model elements and for
instance the extensive margin of labor supply.
32See King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002) for details
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U(c, n) =
1
1− ν c
1−νv(n) if 0 < ν < 1 or ν > 1,
U(c, n) = log(c) + v(n) if ν = 1.
To reformulate the household problem recursively, one replaces consumption with its
growth-adjusted version in both the household’s budget constraint and the household’s ob-
jective function (see the next subsection for the details). With the second version of the
momentary utility function, such “adjustment terms” drop out into a separate additive term
which can be ignored:
Et
100−J∑
j=J
βj
[
log(ct,j) + v(nj)− F1[nj>0]
]
= Et
100−J∑
j=J
βj
[
log(ct,j/Zt) + v(nj)− F1[nj>0] + log(Zt)
]
= Et
100−J∑
j=J
βj
[
log(czj) + v(nj)− F1[nj>0]
]
+ Et
∑
t=j
βt log(Zt)
where czj = ct,j/Zt.
This procedure would not work with the first version of the momentary utility function.
Proceeding the same way, we would obtain:
Et
100−J∑
j=J
βj
[
1
1− ν c
1−ν
t,j v(nj)− F1[nj>0]
]
=
Et
100−J∑
j=J
β˜j
[
1
1− ν (c
z
j)
1−νv(nj)
]
− Et
100−J∑
j=J
βjF1[nj>0]
where β˜ = βZ1−ν . This means that as time passes by, fixed participation costs become
“more important” for the houshold (since it uses the original discount factor, β).
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9.2 Recursive formulation of the household problem
Households of age J in period t maximize
U = Et
100−J∑
j=J
ω(j)
(
log(ct,j)− χ
(nmt,j)
1+η
1 + η
− χ(n
w
t,j)
1+η
1 + η
− F · 1[nwt,j>0]
)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the evolution of ut, subject to the sequence
of budget constraints:
ct,j(1 + τc) + kt+1,j+1 =

(kt,j + Γt) (1 + rt(1− τk)) + gt +WLt,j, if j < 65
(kt,j + Γt) (1 + rt(1− τk)) + gt + Ψt, if j ≥ 65
where WL is the household labor income (and unemployment benefits in case wife doesn’t
work):
WLt,j =
(
WL,mt,j +W
L,w
t,j
)(
1− τss − τl
(
WL,mt,j +W
L,w
t,j
))
+
(
1− 1[nwt,j>0]
)
Tt,
WL,mt,j and W
L,w
t,j are the labor incomes of the two household memebers:
WL,it,j =
nit,jwte
ai+γ0ι+γ1ιe
i
t,j+γ2ι(e
i
t,j)
2+γ3ι(eit,j)
3+uit,j
1 + τ˜ss
, i = m,w
which depend on the individual’s fixed type ai, experience e
i
t,j (which we assume equals age
for men) and productivity shock uit,j.
To reformulate this household problem recursively, we divide the budget constraints by
the technology level Zt. Recall that with our normalization of Z0 and K0, we have Zt = Yt.
Also, recall that on the balanced growth path, Γz = Γt/Zt, g
z = gt/Zt, Ψ
z = Ψt/Zt, T
z =
Tt/Zt, w
z = wt/Zt and rt must remain constant. We define c
z
j = ct,j/Zt and k
z
j = kt,j/Zt and
conjecture that they do not depend on the calendar time t either. This allows us to rewrite
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the budget constraints as:
czj(1 + τc) + k
z
j+1(1 + µ) =

(kzj + Γ
z) (1 + r(1− τk)) + gz +WLj , if j < 65
(kzj + Γ
z) (1 + r(1− τk)) + gz + Ψ z, if j ≥ 65
Substituting ct,j = c
z
jZt into the objective function, we get an additive term that depends
only on the sequence of Zt and drops out of the maximization problem, and finally get the
recursive formulation stated in the main text.
9.3 Tax function
Given the tax function
ya = θ0y
1−θ1
we employ, the average tax rate is defined as
ya = (1− τ(y))y
and thus
θ0y
1−θ1 = (1− τ(y))y
and thus
1− τ(y) = θ0y−θ1
τ(y) = 1− θ0y−θ1
T (y) = τ(y)y = y − θ0y1−θ1
T ′(y) = 1− (1− θ1)θ0y−θ1
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Thus the tax wedge for any two incomes (y1, y2) is given by
1− 1− T
′(y2)
1− T ′(y1) = 1−
(
y2
y1
)−θ1
= 1− 1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1) (12)
and therefore independent of the scaling parameter θ0
33. Thus by construction one can
raise average taxes by lowering θ0 and not change the progressivity of the tax code, since (as
long as tax progressivity is defined by the tax wedges) the progressivity of the tax code34
is uniquely determined by the parameter θ1. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012)
estimate the parameter θ1 = 0.18 for all households. Above we let θ1 vary by family type.
9.4 Estimation of Returns to Experience and Shock Processes From the PSID
We take the log of equation 5 and estimate a log(wage) equation using data from the non-
poverty sample of the PSID 1968-1997. Equation 6 is estimated using the residuals from
5.
To control for selection into the labor market, we use Heckman’s 2-step selection model.
For people who are working and for which we observe wages, the wage depends on a 3rd
order polynomial in age (men), t, or years of labor market experience (women), e, as well as
dummies for the year of observation, D:
log(wit) = φi(constant+D
′
tζ + γ1eit + γ2e
2
it + γ3e
3
it + uit) (13)
Age and labor market experience are the only observable determinants of wages in the
model apart from gender. The probability of participation (or selection equation) depends
33It should be noted that the last inequality only holds in the absence of additional lumpsum transfers.
34Note that
1− τ(y) = 1− T
′(y)
1− θ1 > 1− T
′(y)
and thus as long as θ1 ∈ (0, 1) we have that
T ′(y) > τ(y)
and thus marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates for all income levels.
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on various demographic characteristics, Z:
Φ(participation) = Φ(Z ′itξ + υit) (14)
The variables included in Z are marital status, age, the number of children, years of schooling,
time dummies, and an interaction term between years of schooling and age. To obtain the
parameters, σι, ρι and σαι we obtain the residuals uit and use them to estimate the below
equation by fixed effects estimation:
uit = αi + ρuit−1 + it (15)
The parameters can be found in Table 2.
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9.5 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 5: Tax Functions by Country and Family Type, OECD 2000-2007
Country
Married 0C Married 1C Married 2C Single 0C
θ0 θ1 θ0 θ1 θ0 θ1 θ0 θ1
Austria 0.926427 0.150146 1.003047 0.198779 1.076124 0.23796 0.854448 0.175967
Canada 0.901481 0.155047 0.981109 0.228148 1.066354 0.296329 0.789222 0.147083
Denmark 0.787587 0.229954 0.874734 0.305302 0.920347 0.331685 0.690296 0.220311
Finland 0.868634 0.223116 0.92298 0.261043 0.976928 0.293236 0.763024 0.207634
France 0.917449 0.119957 0.944289 0.133912 1.019455 0.174277 0.85033 0.137575
Germany 0.892851 0.203455 0.956596 0.238398 1.022274 0.272051 0.77908 0.198354
Greece 1.060959 0.161687 1.088914 0.178131 1.127027 0.19963 1.019879 0.228461
Iceland 0.872072 0.194488 0.932844 0.243148 0.990471 0.287094 0.784118 0.153982
Ireland 0.946339 0.162836 1.101397 0.282089 1.187044 0.326003 0.85533 0.188647
Italy 0.900157 0.15939 0.949843 0.198573 1.00814 0.241968 0.822067 0.153275
Japan 0.948966 0.073769 0.971621 0.086518 0.992375 0.097036 0.916685 0.121497
Luxembourg 0.947723 0.15099 1.024163 0.190363 1.113409 0.231438 0.849657 0.163415
Netherlands 0.958121 0.219349 1.004174 0.245393 1.025102 0.256418 0.863586 0.272312
Norway 0.838322 0.148316 0.894721 0.194368 0.932718 0.218213 0.76396 0.146082
Portugal 0.948209 0.119169 0.97794 0.138682 1.009808 0.157309 0.882183 0.132277
Spain 0.923449 0.130171 0.93517 0.134039 0.949941 0.14052 0.862569 0.164186
Sweden 0.782747 0.166797 0.865716 0.240567 0.919471 0.276415 0.717018 0.217619
Switzerland 0.925567 0.116475 0.968531 0.136431 1.008289 0.15569 0.878904 0.128988
UK 0.908935 0.165287 0.994826 0.233248 1.049323 0.273376 0.836123 0.168479
US 0.873964 0.108002 0.940772 0.158466 1.006167 0.203638 0.817733 0.1106
Table 6: Distribution of households (with a head between 20 and 64 years of age) by the
number of children and marital status, IPUMS USA, 2000-2007
Marital status
Single Married Total
#
of
ch
il
d
re
n
0 29.28 20.86 50.15
1 7.49 13.27 20.76
2 4.41 14.26 18.67
3 1.65 5.81 7.46
4 0.50 1.61 2.11
5 0.14 0.42 0.56
6 0.04 0.14 0.18
7 0.01 0.05 0.07
8 0.00 0.02 0.03
9+ 0.00 0.02 0.02
Total 43.54 56.46 100.00
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Table 7: Labor Income Taxes Paid by Income Deciles (benchmark calibration)
Income Decile Share of Total Cumulative Share
1 0.000 0.000
2 0.011 0.012
3 0.024 0.036
4 0.037 0.073
5 0.053 0.126
6 0.072 0.198
7 0.097 0.294
8 0.136 0.431
9 0.201 0.631
10 0.369 1.000
Table 8: The Impact of Progressivity for Different Uses of Additional Revenue
g-curves
Progressivity = Xθ1US Max. TR (% of benchmark)
Max.TR(prog=X)
Max.TR(prog=1)
0.0 166.9 106.5
1.0 156.7 100.0
2.0 144.7 92.3
3.0 130.4 83.2
b-curves
Progressivity = Xθ1US Max. TR (% of benchmark)
Max.TR(prog=X)
Max.TR(prog=1)
0.0 216.8 107.9
1.0 200.9 100.0
2.0 182.4 90.8
3.0 160.9 80.1
s-curves
Progressivity = Xθ1US Max. TR (% of benchmark)
Max.TR(prog=X)
Max.TR(prog=1)
0.0 175.5 107.2
1.0 163.8 100.0
2.0 150.3 91.8
3.0 134.7 82.3
For g-curves, additional tax revenues are redistributed back to households as a lumpsum pay-
ment. For b-curves additional tax revenues are used to service debt. For s-curves additional
tax revenues are waisted.
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Table 9: Selected Statistics for Different Tax Progressivity at 17.5%, 25% and 35% Average
Tax Rate as % of the US Benchmark
τ¯(y) = 17.5% τ¯(y) = 25% τ¯(y) = 35%
Flat tax US Prog. 2X US Prog. Flat Tax US Prog. 2X US Prog. Flat Tax US Prog. 2X US Prog.
Flat tax US Prog. 2X US Prog Flat tax US Prog. 2X US Prog Flat tax US Prog. 2X US Prog.
Tax Revenue 104.6 100.0 93.7 123.5 117.8 110.1 143.9 136.8 127.5
θ0 0.927 1.000 1.056 0.843 0.907 0.956 0.729 0.783 0.822
Labor Supply 103.4 100.0 94.5 97.6 94.4 89.3 89.6 86.4 81.8
Labor supply in Efficiency Units 104.5 100.0 93.6 100.1 95.5 89.4 93.7 89.1 83.2
Male Labor Supply 103.6 100.0 95.6 101.6 98.1 93.6 98.7 95.2 90.8
Single Male Labor Supply 102.9 100.0 96.5 100.7 98.0 94.6 97.6 95.1 91.8
Married Male Labor Supply 104.0 100.0 95.1 102.1 98.1 93.2 99.2 95.3 90.3
Female Labor Supply 103.1 100.0 93.0 92.0 89.2 83.2 76.8 73.9 69.1
Single Female Labor Supply 89.4 100.0 108.1 77.1 87.5 96.4 60.8 70.0 79.6
Married Female Labor Supply 112.7 100.0 82.5 102.4 90.4 74.0 88.0 76.6 61.8
Female LFP 96.6 100.0 100.5 89.3 92.6 93.6 78.7 81.1 82.5
Single Female LFP 86.1 100.0 113.4 77.9 91.3 105.4 65.7 78.0 92.2
Married Female LFP 103.9 100.0 91.5 97.3 93.4 85.3 87.7 83.3 75.6
Female Intensive Margin 106.8 100.0 92.6 103.1 96.4 88.9 97.7 91.1 83.8
Single Female Intensive Margin 103.9 100.0 95.3 99.0 95.8 91.4 92.5 89.8 86.3
Married Female Intensive Margin 108.4 100.0 90.2 105.3 96.8 86.7 100.3 91.9 81.7
Savings 106.7 100.0 92.2 98.7 92.8 85.6 88.6 83.3 77.0
Column 3 is the US bechmark calibration.
Table 10: Selected Statistics for Different Tax Progressivity at Fixed θ0 as % of the US
Benchmark
θ0 = θ0US θ0 = 0.907 ∗ θ0US θ0 = 0.7825 ∗ θ0US
Flat tax US Prog. 2X US Prog. Flat Tax US Prog. 2X US Prog. Flat Tax US Prog. 2X US Prog.
Average Tax Rate 11.0% 17.5% 21.7% 19.2% 25.0% 28.7% 30.2% 35.0% 38.0%
Tax Revenue 86.0 100.0 103.2 109.3 117.8 117.1 134.9 136.8 131.6
Labor Supply 108.3 100.0 91.7 102.1 94.4 86.6 93.5 86.4 79.4
Labor supply in Efficiency Units 108.2 100.0 91.3 103.5 95.5 87.2 96.8 89.1 35.2
Male Labor Supply 105.3 100.0 94.5 103.2 98.1 92.6 100.1 95.2 77.6
Single Male Labor Supply 104.7 100.0 95.5 102.4 98.0 93.6 99.1 95.1 114.3
Married Male Labor Supply 105.6 100.0 94.0 103.6 98.1 92.2 100.6 95.3 89.4
Female Labor Supply 112.5 100.0 87.7 100.6 89.2 78.2 84.1 73.9 64.5
Single Female Labor Supply 100.3 100.0 101.8 86.6 87.5 90.4 68.6 70.0 74.0
Married Female Labor Supply 121.0 100.0 77.9 110.4 90.4 69.6 94.9 76.6 57.9
Female LFP 102.2 100.0 96.9 95.0 92.6 89.8 83.7 81.1 78.6
Single Female LFP 92.8 100.0 109.4 84.3 91.3 101.0 71.6 78.0 87.5
Married Female LFP 108.7 100.0 88.2 102.5 93.4 81.9 92.2 83.3 72.4
Female Intensive Margin 110.1 100.0 90.5 105.9 96.4 87.1 100.4 91.1 82.1
Single Female Intensive Margin 108.0 100.0 93.1 102.8 95.8 89.6 95.8 89.8 84.6
Married Female Intensive Margin 111.3 100.0 88.3 107.7 96.8 85.0 102.9 91.9 79.9
Savings 113.8 100.0 88.5 104.8 92.8 82.5 93.4 83.3 74.5
Column 3 is the US bechmark calibration.
Table 11: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously (Germany)
Parameter Value Description Moment Moment Value
γ0m -1.367 wt(ai, ei, ui) = wte
ai+γ0w+γ1wei+γ2we
2
i+γ3we
3
i+ui Gender earnings ratio 2.081
β 1.014 Discount factor K/Y 2.640
µFMw -0.072 F
Mw ∼ N(µFMw , σ2FMw) Married fem employment 0.540
σFMw 0.042 U
M(c, nm, nw) = log(c)− χMm (nm)1+η
m
1+ηm
− R2 from 1[nt>0] = ρ0 + ρ11[nt−1>0] 0.512
χMw 2.916 χMw (n
w)1+η
w
1+ηw
− FMw · 1[nw>0] Married female hours 0.171 (933 h/year)
χMm 19.800 Married male hours 0.340 (1855 h/year)
µFSw 0.087 F
Sw ∼ N(µFSw , σ2SMw) Single fem. employment 0.586
σFSw 0.203 U
S(c, n, ι) = log(c)− χSι (n)1+η
ι
1+ηι
R2 from 1[nt>0] = ρ0 + ρ11[nt−1>0] 0.420
χSw 4.100 −F Sι · 1[n>0] Single female hours 0.239 (1303 h/year)
χSm 41.400 Single male hours 0.296 (1616 h/year)
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Figure 10: Labor Supply and Earnings Statistics by Tax Progressivity and Level for g-Laffer
Curves
Figure 11: Labor Force Participation for Married and Single Women by Tax Progressivity
and Level for g-Laffer Curves
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Figure 12: The Impact of Tax Progressivity on Revenue From Labor Income Taxes, Con-
sumption Taxes and Capital Income Taxes
Figure 13: Laffer Curves for the Full Model and a Rep. Agent Model With Equivalent Labor
Supply Elasticity After a 1-Period Productivity Shock (1/η = 0.491).
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Figure 14: Laffer Curves for the Rep. Agent Model with Different Labor Supply Elasticities
(left). The Impact of Progressivity on Maximum Revenue in the Rep. Agent Model with
Different Labor Supply Elasticites (right).
Figure 15: Laffer Curves and Maximum Sustainable Debt for Flat Taxes in Different Models
Figure 16: The Impact of Progressivity on Maximum Revenue and Sustainable Debt in
Different Models
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Figure 17: The Impact of Tax Progressivity for Different Utility Functions
Figure 18: The Impact of Tax Progressivity for Different Labor Supply Elasticities
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